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Abstract
In this paper we use a large linked employer-employee data set on German estab-
lishments between 1993 and 2012 to investigate how the gender composition of the top
layer of management affects a variety of establishment and worker outcomes. We use
two different measures to identify the gender composition of the top layer based on
direct survey data: the fraction of women among top managers, and the fraction of
women among working proprietors. We document the following facts: a) There is a
strong negative association between the fraction of women in the top layer of manage-
ment and several establishment outcomes, among them business volume, investment,
total wage bill per worker, total employment, and turnover; b) Establishments with a
high fraction of women in the top layer of management are more likely to implement
female-friendly policies, such as providing childcare facilities or promoting and men-
toring female junior staff; c) The fraction of women in the top layer of management is
also negatively associated with employment and wages, both male and female, full-time
and part-time. However, all of these associations vanish when we include establishment
fixed effects and establishment-specific time trends. This reveals a substantial sorting
of female managers across establishments: small and less productive establishments
that invest less, pay their employees lower wages, but are more female-friendly are
more likely to be led by women.
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1 Introduction
Despite large increases in female labor force participation rates over the past five decades,
women are still substantially underrepresented in top leadership positions in the corporate
world. Nevertheless, the numbers have been steadily increasing: the share of women among
top corporate officers of Fortune 500 companies has risen from 8.7% in 1995, to 15.7% in
2008.1 It is reasonable to expect that this trend will continue in the foreseeable future, as
the gender gap in educational attainment (favoring women) continues to grow (Goldin et
al., 2006), and the share of women attending and graduating from business schools now
approaches 50%.2
It is natural to ask what effect the increasing representation of women at the top can
have on firm outcomes. A growing literature, following Bertrand and Schoar (2003) has
shown that individual manager characteristics matter for firm performance. While most of
the literature has focused on management style or specific attitudes of top managers (such
as risk aversion), only a limited number of studies in the economics literature have looked
explicitly at the effect of gender on firm’s outcomes. Women advocacy groups often make
the claim that a more diverse leadership can achieve better performance for the firm by
leveraging to the full extent the available talent pool.3 One important dimension in which
the gender of the leadership may affect outcomes is in wage policies. If the gender gap in
wages is at least in part due to discriminatory behavior by (mostly male) executives, one
would expect that a higher representation of women in the top echelons of management would
1Source: http://www.catalyst.org/knowledge/women-corporate-officers-fortune-500. The
Census of Corporate Officers and Top Earners of Fortune 500 Companies has been conducted annually
since 1996 by Catalyst, a non-profit organization with a mission to expand the opportunities of women and
business.
2NCES, Digest of Education Statistics, 2012. See also Bertrand et al. (2010). Recent figures, however,
show that this progress may have stalled after years of accelerating (”An Elusive Jackpot: Riches Come to
Women as C.E.O.s, but Few Get There”, The New York Times, June 7, 2014).
3For example, in her best-selling book Lean In, Sheryl Sandberg (2013) writes that “...The laws of
economics and many studies of diversity tell us that if we tapped the entire pool of human resources and
talent, our collective performance would improve.”
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lead to a narrowing of the gender pay gap, and more opportunities for the advancement of
women inside the firm hierarchy. Alternatively, female executives, being more attuned to
the needs of female employees, may be more likely to promote female friendly policies, such
as provision of child care or specific mentoring programs.4
The goal of this paper is to explicitly investigate how the gender composition of the
top layer of management affects firm and employee outcomes. To this purpose, we use
a large linked employer-employee data set on German establishments between 1993 and
2012. The longitudinal nature of the data set allows us to control for the most obvious
source of bias deriving from the nonrandom allocation of women to top leadership positions,
by estimating models with a rich dynamic structure of firm unobservables. Moreover, the
linked employer-employee nature of the data means that we can look at both establishment
outcomes, such as business volume, investments, and specific policies targeted at women;
and detailed employee-level outcomes, such as employment and wages by full-time/part-
time status.
The main findings can be summarized as follows: a) There is a strong negative association
between the fraction of women in the top layer of management and several establishment
outcomes, among them business volume, investment, the total wage bill per worker, total
employment, and turnover; b) Establishments with a high fraction of women in the top
layer of management are more likely to implement female-friendly policies, such as providing
childcare facilities or promoting and mentoring female junior staff; c) The fraction of women
in the top layer of management is also negatively associated with employment and wages,
both male and female, full-time and part-time. However, all of these associations vanish
4It is not obvious, however, that the gender of the leadership should have any effect on firm outcomes:
the neoclassical view of the firm assumes that “top managers are homogeneous and selfless inputs into the
production process” (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003, p. 1173), and therefore, even if executives differ in their
preferences or attitudes because of their gender, this will have no effect on firm policies or outcomes. By
contrast, standard agency models acknowledge that the objectives of managers and shareholders may not
necessarily be aligned, and therefore personal manager characteristics may have an effect on their decisions.
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when we include establishment fixed effects and specific time trends, suggesting no causal link
between women’s representation in top management and establishment outcomes. Instead,
there appears to be substantial sorting of female managers across establishments: small and
less productive establishments that invest less, pay their employees lower wages, but are
more female-friendly are more likely to be led by women.
The results are mostly inconsistent with simple theories of labor market discrimination,
which would predict that, if women have less discriminatory tastes toward other women,
then a higher fraction of women in leadership positions would lead to improved relative
employment and wage outcomes, as well as to higher productivity. We also find no evidence
that women in leadership positions implement policies that would be more friendly to female
employees. These figures are broadly in line with much of the previous literature, which has
tended to find mostly zero or negative effects of female leadership on firm performance
(Bertrand et al., 2014).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the related literature.
In Section 3, we describe the data. In Section 4, we describe the econometric framework and
discuss the conditions under which this design identifies a parameter of interest. In Section 5
we present the main results and discuss possible interpretations to our findings. We conclude
with Section 6.
2 Literature Review
There is by now a growing body of literature in economics that looks at the relationship
between the fraction of women in the top echelons of firms’ hierarchies and a variety of firm
outcomes. The studies differ in the types of firms under analysis, in the definition of female
leadership, and in the main outcomes of interest. The studies can be broadly grouped in two
categories: those that focus on corporate outcomes such as profits, investment, stock returns,
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and Tobin’s Q, and those that focus more on employee outcomes. Within the first category,
we can further distinguish between those that analyze specifically the effects of women in
top executive positions, and those that instead focus more on issues of governance, and the
role of women among the board of directors. Within this latter category, the studies that
exploit the imposition of a gender quota in Norwegian listed firms deserve a special mention.
A summary of some of the most prominent studies in this literature is presented in Table
1. The Table highlights how these differ in terms of the characteristics of the sample, the
definition of female leadership, the outcomes of interest, and the methodology used. In what
follows we discuss these studies more at length.
One of the first studies that investigates the effects of female leadership on firm perfor-
mance is Wolfers (2006). He uses a combination of OLS and matching methods and finds no
evidence of systematic differences in excess returns to holding S&P stock of female-headed
companies. Smith et al. (2006), using both OLS and IV methods (where the fraction of
women in top management is instrumented by the education of male CEO’s wives), find
that the proportion of women in top management jobs tend to be positively associated with
firm performance in a panel of large Danish firms, but the association becomes largely in-
significant once one controls for firm fixed effects. Amore et al. (2013) find that only the joint
presence of women in CEO and governance positions significantly improves firm performance
in a sample of family-controlled firms in Italy.5 Using a subset of the data that we use in this
paper, Laible (2013) finds a slight negative correlation between the proportion of women in
top management and establishment performance. In a slightly different vein, Parrotta and
Smith (2013) document the existence of a negative association between female CEO and the
variability of firm outcomes, in line with the experimental evidence that women typically
exhibit higher risk aversion than men (Croson and Gneezy, 2009).
5Gagliarducci and Paserman (2012) also find important interaction effects between the gender of the
leader and that of the immediate subordinates in the political arena.
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The second set of studies focuses more on firm governance, and in particular on the role
women in the board of directors. Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that, in a sample of US
firms, female directors have better attendance and do more monitoring but gender diversity
has a negative effect on firm performance. These results are robust to instrumenting the
fraction of women directors with the fraction of male directors that are connected (through
other boards) with female directors. Adams and Funk (2012) document that female and
male board directors differ in their core values and risk attitudes, but in ways that diverge
from gender differences in the general population. For example, female directors are more
universally concerned and less power oriented, but they are also more risk-loving than their
male counterparts.
More recently, various authors have examined the introduction in Norway of gender
quotas on executive boards. The Norwegian reform, which was enacted in December 2003,
required all public limited liability companies to have at least 40% of board directors from
each gender within two years of the passage of the law. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) found
that affected firms (i.e., firms that were induced by the law to substantially increase the
representation of women on their board) experienced a significant drop in stock prices at the
time of the announcement of the law, and that firm performance, as measured by Tobin’s Q,
was also negatively affected. They also found evidence that newly appointed female board
members were on average less experienced. Matsa and Miller (2013) also found a decrease
in profits and assets, as well as an increase in employment and labor costs in “treated”
firms. However, it should be noted that a substantial fraction of limited-liability companies
switched their legal status after the enactment of the law, making them no longer subject to
the gender quota, and thus introducing potential survivor bias in the analysis of the reform.
On the whole, the literature on firm performance finds little evidence of a positive effect
of female leadership on firm outcomes, with some studies in fact finding evidence of negative
effects. Even when the effects are positive, the results are sometimes qualified, and not
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always robust to econometric methods that account more credibly for potential endogeneity
of the female leadership variable.
A more limited number of studies have looked instead at the effect of the gender com-
position of top management on the level and distribution of employee wages. Flabbi et al.
(2013) use a matched employer-employee data set on Italian manufacturing firms and a fixed
effects identification strategy to show that the interaction between female leadership and fe-
male workers at the firm has a positive significant impact on sales, value added and TFP per
worker. Moreover, they document that female leadership leads to wage increases for women
at the top of the wage distribution, and wage decreases for women at the bottom. They
interpret their results in terms of a simple model of statistical discrimination, in which an
inefficient gender allocation across the firm is only corrected when female leadership takes
over. Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2007) use Portuguese firm-level data and a fixed effects
strategy, and find that, while a higher share of females in a firm corresponds to lower wages
for both female and male workers, female workers benefit from higher wages in female-led
firms than in male-led firms. Tate and Yang (2014) also find some indirect evidence on the
effect of female leadership on the gender gap: following a plant closure, female wages drop
by substantially less if they move to a new firm with a higher fraction of female managers.
However, in the context of the Norwegian reform, Bertrand et al. (2014) find essentially no
effect of female board members on the fraction of women at various points of the wage dis-
tribution (with the exception of the top 5 earners), and no effect on the gender gap. Finally,
Matsa and Miller (2014) use a sample of privately owned US firms to look at employment
outcomes. They find that female ownership is associated with smaller workforce reductions
during the Great Recession.
With respect to this literature, our contribution is threefold. First, our sample is rep-
resentative of the universe of establishments in Germany, and therefore we are not limited
to the analysis of establishments of a specific sector, size, or legal form; moreover, the fact
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that we observe also a large number of small and medium-sized establishments implies that
the fraction of women in top management is relatively high. Second, the linked employer-
employee nature of our data means that we are able to observe both establishment outcomes
(such as sales, investments), and employee outcomes (such as employment and wages). One
of the distinct features of our study is that we also have unique information on the imple-
mentation of female-friendly personnel policies. Having the complete roster of the firms’
employees allows us to look specifically at the outcomes of employees who are not part of
top management. Third, the long nature of our panel (some firms are observed continuously
for almost 20 years) allows us to specify a rich dynamic structure for the error term in our
econometric specification. In particular, controlling for establishment-specific time trends
allows us to control for any time-varying unobserved patterns that may play a key role in
determining establishment and employee outcomes, and are also correlated with the frac-
tion of women in top management. Much of the existing literature used instead a simple
fixed effects strategy; an IV strategy with instruments whose orthogonality with respect to
time-varying unobservables at the firm level may not always be justified; or exploited the
natural experiment induced by the imposition of gender quotas in Norway, effectively ob-
taining identification from the variation in the share of women in the board of directors prior
to the reform. We therefore view our approach as complementary to the existing literature.
3 Data
The IAB Establishment Panel is an annual representative survey of German establishments
that has been conducted by the IAB (Institute for Employment Research - Institut fu¨r
Arbeitsmarkt und Berufsforschung) since 1993 (and since 1996 in East Germany). It gathers
yearly information for about 4,000-16,000 establishments on employment, business policy,
investments, personnel structure, wages, and general company information. Each wave has
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a supplementary questionnaire with additional information on specific topics, ranging from
IT equipments to environmental standards. The last available wave is the 2012 one.6
Matched with the employee social security history from 1993 to 2010, the Establish-
ment Panel forms the Linked Employer/Employee Data (LIAB). Individual data cover socio-
demographic characteristics (gender, year of birth, nationality, education and professional
qualifications), and employment-related characteristics (start and end date of employment,
type of employment, gross earnings, profession, occupational status, reason for employment
notification) of all employees (both full-time and part-time), trainees and apprentices of IAB
establishments subject to social insurance payments, as well as marginal part-time employ-
ees. Some categories of workers, e.g., civil servants, the self-employed, working proprietors,
and unpaid family workers are not subject to social insurance, and are therefore not included
in the LIAB.7
For our analysis, we restrict attention to establishments in West Germany that have at
least 10 employees in each survey year. This restriction ensures that we have a sample of
relatively large and stable establishments. All estimates are based on both private and public
sector establishments, except for those on business volume and investments per worker, which
are based on private sector establishments only.8
In order to identify the fraction of women in top management, we rely on two different
survey-based measures. The first measure comes from the supplementary questionnaire
focusing on senior management conducted in the 2004, 2008, and 2012 waves of the IAB
Establishment Panel. In these three waves, establishments were asked to report directly the
number of managers in the top layer (including proprietors, their family members, directors,
6Data is collected at the establishment level, so it is possible that some establishments belong to the
same firm. It is not possible, however, to link establishments by ownership.
7Working proprietors include all individual proprietors and partners actively engaged in the work of the
establishment, excluding silent or inactive partners whose principal activity is outside of the establishment.
See also the OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms.
8Public sector establishments are not Public Administration, but service providers like: waste collection,
radio and telecommunications, health care, and entertainment.
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and branch managers), separately by gender. The second measure, which also comes from the
IAB Establishment Panel, is the fraction of women among working proprietors, including
their family members. This measure is available in 1993, and then every year from 1997
onwards.9
Table 2 describes some of the basic characteristics of our sample. The second and third
columns show the number of establishments present in each wave, and those that remain in
our main analysis sample after imposing the geographic and size restrictions. The number
of establishments in the survey has significantly increased over time, as much as the corre-
sponding number of establishments in the analysis sample. The remaining two columns show
the evolution of the fraction of women in the top layers of management over time, according
to the two different measures. The fraction of women in top management went from 13.9%
in 2004 to 18.5% in 2012. These numbers are only slightly higher than the fraction of women
among working proprietors, which went from 8% in 1997 to 15.8% in 2012. It is interesting
to notice that both measures exhibit an increasing trend over time, which is evidence of a
reduction in the gender glass ceiling. For the years in which both measures are available,
the correlation between the two is 0.97.
Table 3 reports the characteristics of the establishments in the analysis sample. Almost
37% of the establishments have less than 50 employees, 46% have between 50 and 500 em-
ployees, while the remaining 17% have more than 500 employees. Most of the establishments
are independent (57%), while 28% are a branch and 15% are the head office of a group of
establishments. At the same time, 55% of the establishments are a limited liability com-
9The second measure is not available for all establishments surveyed in a given year, because some
establishments do not have any working proprietors. This may raise concerns of potential selection bias, as
establishments with and without working proprietors may differ systematically. However, it turns out that
the two samples are in fact quite similar along several dimensions: for example, among establishments with
more than 10 employees in the whole sample, 39.8% have 10-49 employees, 47.8% have between 50 and 499
employees, and 12.3% have more than 500 employees; the corresponding numbers for establishments with
any working proprietors are 42.4%, 44.6% and 12.8%. The distribution by region or by economics sector are
also quite similar.
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pany, 6% are a partnership, 7% are individually-owned, and 17% are public corporations.
The largest fraction of establishments is in the manufacturing sector (28%), followed by the
retail (12%) and the public sector (12%). Interestingly, 70% of the establishments are ob-
served at least two times and 54% at least three times, thus providing a sufficiently large
longitudinal variation for the panel identification (see the next section).
Table 4 reports summary statistics for our key dependent variables of interest. The top
panel refers to firm-level outcomes obtained from the establishment survey, while the bottom
panel refers to employee-level outcomes calculated from the linked employer-employee data.
The average establishment has a total of 107 employees, with average labor costs of 2,083
euros per month, produces 124,661 euros of business volume in the year, and makes invest-
ments per worker in the order of 208 euros per year.10 The hiring rate and the termination
rate have a similar magnitude (5%), with a resulting turnover rate of about 10%.
The next set of variables reflects establishment-level policies that are designed to facili-
tate the integration of women in the workforce. First, we report the fraction of employees
who are allowed to use a flexible working-time account, a variable that is available in the
establishment survey in selected years between 1999 and 2012. The average establishment
had about 50% of its employees with access to flexible working hours. Next, we construct
an index of female-friendly policies, using the supplement on equal opportunity available in
the establishment survey in 2002, 2004, 2008 and 2012. Establishments were presented with
a list of ”possibilities to enhance equal opportunity,” and were asked to indicate which of
these measures existed within the company. Because the exact number of measures varies
across years, we construct a simple index of female-friendly policies as the simple average
across all measures in a given year. The average value of this index is 0.14, with 46% of
establishments implementing at least one female friendly policy. We also report on three spe-
10All monetary values are expressed in 2005 euros. Business volume is either sales or assets (if a financial
institution). Business volume and investments are not available in 2012.
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cific measures on which we have consistent information in every year: 9% of establishments
provide childcare facilities, 26% have policies to support parental leave, and 10% actively
engage in promotion and mentoring of junior female staff.11
Most of the individual level variables, which refer to workers in bottom 95% of the
within-establishment wage distribution, are in line with what expected: on average there are
more men than women, while women are overrepresented among part-time workers, both
in absolute and relative terms. Wages present similar dynamics, with men being paid more
than women: the gender gap in both full-time and part-time wages stands at about 17 log
points. 12
4 Methodology
Let Yjt be a variable representing both establishment j outcomes (such as business volume,
investments, wage bill, hiring, and termination), and detailed employee-level outcomes (such
as wages and employment, by gender and full-time/part-time status) at time t. We estimate
the following model by ordinary least squares (OLS):
Yjt = α + βFrWomTopjt + γ
′Xjt + λj + timej + jt (1)
where FrWomTopjt is the fraction of women in the top layer of management of firm j at time
t (based on one of the two definitions described previously); Xjt is a vector of establishment
characteristics that includes year, region, sector, firm size, type of establishment and legal
form dummies, plus the average demographic characteristics (age, education, tenure at the
firm, and foreign nationality status) of the management level, identified as the 5% highest
11Other female friendly policies that are not asked consistently in every survey wave include: support
for employees with relatives requiring care, consideration of needs of employees with care responsibilities,
member of network of family friendly companies.
12Employee data only refer to workers entitled to social security. These do not include working proprietors,
unpaid family workers, self-employed, civil servants, and marginal part-time workers.
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earning workers, and dummies for whether any of the establishment or demographic charac-
teristics are missing; λj is an establishment fixed-effect that accounts for any time-invariant
unobserved characteristics, and timej is an establishment-specific linear time trend that ac-
commodates for smooth unobserved changes at establishment level. By construction, the
identifying sample in the model with establishment fixed effects consists of establishments
observed at least twice in time, while the identifying sample in the model that also includes
firm-specific time trends consists of establishments observed for at least three times. To
account for potential serial correlation in the error term, we always cluster standard errors
at the establishment level.
The main advantage of the long panel and the empirical methodology is that it achieves
identification only from the within-establishment variation in the fraction of women in top
management, or the deviation of this variable from its long-term trend. The inclusion of
establishment fixed effects allows us to remove the most obvious source of confounding vari-
ation, namely that establishments with a high fraction of women in top management may
be unobservably different in terms of productivity, employment, wages, or any of the other
outcome variables. Moreover, comparison between pooled OLS and fixed-effect estimates
will provide valuable insights on the nature of sorting of female leadership across different
types of establishments. The extensive list of control variables allows us to control for any
important time-varying establishment characteristics that may be correlated with both out-
comes and the fraction of women in top management: for example, if female managers are
on average younger, and establishments with younger managers experience different out-
comes, this will be captured by the inclusion of the average demographic characteristics of
the top management.13 Finally, the inclusion of establishment-specific time trends allows us
to control for additional within-establishment unobservables that change linearly with time.
13While in most specifications we include the full set of control variables, in some cases we omit vari-
ables that are obviously related to the dependent variable: for example, when the dependent variable is
employment, we do not control for establishment size.
12
For example, a smooth change in “firm culture” that leads to modernization and increased
efficiency of production processes, and at the same time to more widespread acceptance of
women in leadership positions, would be accounted for by our methodology. The limita-
tion of the methodology is that it cannot accommodate for sharp unobserved changes in
establishments’ strategies and outcomes, such as those deriving from a change in the compo-
sition of shareholders, or a sudden financial downturn that leads to a change in the gender
composition of the top layer of management.
5 Results
Establishment Outcomes. Tables 5 and 6 presents the results for the effect of the frac-
tion of women in the top layer of management on establishment outcomes. For each de-
pendent variable we report the coefficients from three separate regressions: pooled OLS,
controlling for establishment fixed effects, and controlling for establishment fixed effects and
establishment-specific trends. We also report two different sets of coefficients, one for each of
the two measures female leadership: the fraction of women in the top layer of management,
as elicited in the supplementary module on senior management in 2004, 2008 and 2012 (in
short, the fraction of women in the top layer); and the fraction of women among working
proprietors.14 In all estimates we control for year, region, sector, establishment size and legal
form dummies, plus the average demographic characteristics (age, education, tenure at the
establishment, and foreign nationality status) of the management level, identified as the 5%
highest earning workers, and dummies for whether any of the establishment or demographic
14For business volume and investment, we cannot compute estimates based on establishment-specific time
trends, when the measure of female leadership is the fraction of women in the top layer of management.
This measure is available only in three years, 2004, 2008 and 2012. Questions about business volume and
investment are asked in the establishment survey (which goes up to 2012), but they refer to the previous
calendar year and therefore are unavailable for 2012.
13
characteristics are missing.15
The top panel of Table 5 focuses on establishments’ balance sheet outcomes, as reported
in the establishment survey: business volume per worker, investment per worker, and the
wage bill per worker. The bottom panel, instead, looks at employment outcomes, as reported
in the establishment survey: log of total employment; the hiring rate, defined as the number
of new hires in year t divided by the number of employees in year t− 1; and the termination
rate, defined analogously.16
The OLS regressions show that, no matter which definition we use, the share of women
in top management is strongly negatively correlated with each of the establishment balance
sheet outcomes and with total employment, and positively correlated with the mobility
measures. The point estimates based on the two different measures of female leadership
are quite similar to one another, even though the estimates based on the second measure
(the fraction of women among working proprietors) are generally more precise, because of
the longer panel available to us. Looking at the magnitude of the coefficients, we see that
going from an entirely male to an entirely female top layer of management is associated with
roughly a 0.2-0.3 standard deviation change in the dependent variable. This evidence seems
to validate the results of previous studies showing a negative relationship between female
leadership and firm performance (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012).
However, inclusion of establishment fixed effects makes all of these negative correlations
completely vanish. Not only are most of the estimates no longer statistically significant, they
are also quite small in magnitude. For example, going from an entirely male to an entirely
female top layer of management is not associated with any variation in business volume per
worker, employment, hiring or termination rates, and only a 1.2 percentage point decline in
15We do not report the coefficients for these additional control variables. They all turned to have the
expected sign and magnitude, and are available upon request.
16The survey based measures of wages include, by construction, the top managers themselves and their
wages. The analysis based on individual-level data (Table 7) will enable us to focus only on the workers not
in management positions.
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the wage bill per worker. These small effects are precisely estimated, especially in the speci-
fication that uses the fraction of women among working proprietors as the measure of female
leadership. We can rule out effects as small as 3 log points in business volume, employment,
and the size of the wage bill. The results are essentially unchanged in the specifications
with firm-specific time trends. This suggests that most of the spurious correlation between
establishment outcomes and the fraction of women in top management is already soaked
up by the establishment fixed effects, and any additional establishment unobservables that
change linearly over time are uncorrelated with the fraction of women in top management.
The contrast between the OLS and the fixed effects specifications shows that there is
substantial sorting of female managers across establishments: smaller and less productive
establishments that invest less, and have higher turnover are more likely to be led by women.
Note that the OLS specifications also control for industry dummies, so the results are not
due just to women sorting into sectors with lower productivity, wages, and employment
stability; rather, even within sectors, women in top management are more likely to be found
in establishments with these characteristics.
In Table 6 we report on the correlation between the fraction of women in top manage-
ment and the presence of female-friendly policies. The first panel looks at the fraction of
workers on flexible time accounts, and on the aggregate female-friendly policy index de-
scribed in Section 3. Interestingly, the OLS specification points to a negative relationship
between female leadership and the fraction of workers on flexible time (statistically significant
when measuring female leadership as the fraction of women in top management). Inclusion
of establishment fixed effects and establishment specific time trends make the relationship
become insignificant, even though the point estimate remains negative, and of similar mag-
nitude. We suspect that this negative association can be explained by the fact that flex
time arrangements are much more common in large manufacturing establishments, which
are substantially less likely to have women in top positions. Even though we control for
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establishment size and sector dummies in the regressions, this may not be enough to entirely
remove the spurious correlation.
On the the other hand, there is a positive and statistically significant association be-
tween the female-friendly policy index and female leadership in the OLS specifications, and
the coefficient maintains its magnitude when we control for establishment fixed effects and
establishment specific time trends, even though the estimate loses in precision. The size
of the coefficient is not negligible: going from zero to one hundred percent women in top
management is associated with an increase in the index of 1.3-2.5 percentage points, a 9 to
17 percent increase relative to the baseline of 0.146. The bottom panel of the Table shows
the coefficients for some of the specific policies for which we have consistent information
over multiple years. Female leadership is strongly associated with offering workplace child
care facilities and (to a lesser extent) with promotion and mentoring programs for junior
female staff. On the other hand, there doesn’t seem to be much of a relationship between
female leadership and help for employees on parental leave. Summing up, the evidence is
only mildly supportive of the idea that women in top management are able to promote
more female-friendly workplace policies, but the estimates are too imprecise to convincingly
establish a causal link.
Detailed Employee Outcomes: Employment. One of the main advantages of the
linked employer-employee data is that it allows us look in more detail at employee outcomes.
Specifically, we can use the data to investigate whether the null effects on total employment
found in the previous analysis may in fact mask important differences in the effects on male
versus female employment, or part-time versus full-time employment. In addition, data on
wages allows us to assess the extent to which labor market discrimination plays a role in
explaining the gender gap in wages. We investigate these issues in Tables 7 and 8.
Table 7 looks at the relationship between the fraction of women in top management and
employment outcomes, separately for males and females, and for full-time (top panel) and
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part-time employment (bottom panel). As in the previous tables, we report for each de-
pendent variable the estimates from pooled OLS, fixed effects, and firm-specific time trends
specifications.17 As discussed previously, we want to focus only on the effect of top manage-
ment on the outcomes of non-management employees, and therefore we restrict the analysis
to workers in the bottom 95% of the wage distribution within firms. This should also ensure
that we avoid any mechanical relationship between our key right-hand side variable and any
of the dependent variables.
The OLS estimates show a strong negative correlation between the share of women in
top management and both female and male full-time employment, with the latter coefficient
being about 4-6 times as large. While these results confirm the pattern found in Table 5,
the difference in coefficients shows that there is important heterogeneity in the relationship
between the share of female in top management and firm size. Female leaders are especially
unlikely to be found in firms with a large number of male full-time employees, but only
slightly less likely to be in firms with a high number of female employees. As in the previous
tables, the inclusion of establishment fixed effects makes the coefficients become small and
insignificant. In the specification that uses the fraction of women among working proprietors,
we can rule out effects as small as 3.5-3.8 log points.
We find a similar pattern for part-time employment (bottom panel). There is a strong
negative OLS association between female leadership and male part-time employment. On
the other hand, the OLS coefficient on female part-time employment is zero or even mildly
positive. Inclusion of establishment fixed effects makes all the coefficients become smaller in
magnitude and statistically insignificant.
Interestingly, the absence of any effect on employment and mobility variables (from Table
17The individual-level data only goes up to 2010. Therefore, we can only use two years of data (2004
and 2008) for the specification that uses the fraction of women in top management as the measure of female
leadership. Because of this, we cannot estimate models with establishment-level time trends when using this
measure.
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5) is in contrast with the recent findings of Matsa and Miller (2013 and 2014), who found
that a higher fraction of women in top management led to higher employment and labor costs
(in Norway), and smaller workforce downsizing during recessions (in the US). The difference
in our results could be due to the fact that our sample includes all types of firms (not only
large corporations, where agency problems may arise), and covers a period that spans the
whole business cycle, and not just the Great Recession.
Detailed Employee Outcomes: Wages. A taste-based model of labor market dis-
crimination would predict that, if female employers are less prejudiced against women, then
a higher share of women in top management would reduce the gender pay gap. Theories of
statistical discrimination would also predict an effect of female leadership on the gender gap,
if, for example, female employers have better information about the productivity of female
workers. It is therefore important to test whether we find any support for such theories in
the data.
Table 8 looks at the effect of female leadership on the average wages of employees in
the bottom 95% of the within-establishment wage distribution. To avoid confounding the
effects because of heterogeneity in worker type, we report separately the effects for wages of
full-time (top panel) and part-time workers (bottom panel). The first set of columns reports
the results for female workers, and the second for male workers.
We do not observe a positive effect of female leadership on the relative remuneration
of female employees. As a matter of fact, the regressions show that female leadership is
associated with lower wages of both male and female employees, and for both full-time and
part-time workers, the size of the coefficient being larger (in absolute value) for men. All the
estimated effects, however, are markedly attenuated when we control for firm fixed effects
and firm-specific time trends. Female leadership is associated with a decline of 1.5-2.7 log
points in female full-time wages, and to a decline of 0.4-2.2 log points in male full-time
wages. The coefficients on female wages are estimated somewhat more precisely, but there
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is no statistically significant effect on the gender gap (not reported). The negative effect of
female leadership on part-time wages is somewhat smaller for women and somewhat larger for
men, although the coefficients are never statistically significant, nor is there any statistically
significant effect on the gender gap.
These results are similar to those of Bertrand et al., but not consistent with those of
Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer (2007), Flabbi et al. (2013), and Tate and Yang (2014), who
found some evidence of a positive association between the relative wage outcomes of women
and the share of women in top management. One possible explanation for the discrepancy
is that both Germany and Norway rank somewhat higher than Portugal, Italy, or the US
in terms of economic opportunities for women (Economist Intelligence Unit, 2010), and
therefore the trickle-down effect of more women in top positions on relative wages may be
more muted.
Robustness. For all the above estimations we conducted a series of robustness exercises:
first, in all the estimates on employee outcomes we also included demographics characteristics
of the bottom 95% of employees (mean age and tenure, and percentage of college graduates
and non-Germans); second, we included a firm-specific quadratic trend, instead of linear.
The main results remain almost unchanged in these alternative specifications.18
As a further robustness exercise, in Tables 9 and 10 we provide separate estimates by
establishment size (10-49, 50-499, 500+ employees) for a few selected outcomes.19 We only
report the estimates using the fraction of women among working proprietors as the measure
of female leadership, because with the other measure (available in only three years) we do not
have sufficient observations to break down firms by establishment size. While it is true that
in all previous estimates we were controlling for the size of the establishment, it may still be
18These results available upon request. Since the three models (OLS, fixed effects, firm-specific time
trends) have different identifying samples, we also estimated an OLS model over the fixed effects sample,
and a fixed effects model over the firm-specific time trends sample, with no significant differences on the
estimated coefficients.
19Estimates on the other outcomes are available upon request.
19
valuable to investigate whether the effect of the percentage of women among top management
differs between large (e.g., a factory) and small (e.g., a retail store) establishments. Most of
these additional figures are in line with our baseline results: regardless of size, establishments
with more women among working proprietors have a higher female friendly policy index
(Table 9) and lower full-time employment and wages (Table 10), even though all these effects
disappear once controlling for establishment fixed effects and for specific time trends. More
interestingly, we could not find any significant difference between establishments of a different
size, except that the negative effect on wages seems to be stronger in large establishments
than in small ones (but only for women). We conclude that the size of the establishment
does not seem to interact with the presence of more women in the top management.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have documented the effect of female leadership on aggregate and employee
outcomes in a large panel of German establishments. The evidence points to a large degree
of sorting, with the share of women in top management higher in establishments that are
smaller, less productive, invest less, are more female-friendly, have less stable patterns of em-
ployment, and pay their employees lower wages. However, when we address potential reverse
causality by estimating models with establishment fixed effects and establishment-specific
time trends, all of the relationships at the establishment level become small in magnitude and
statistically insignificant. In fact, in most specifications we find a fairly precisely estimated
null effect of female leadership.
The results are mostly inconsistent with simple theories of labor market discrimination,
which would predict that, if women have less discriminatory tastes toward other women,
then a higher fraction of women in leadership positions would lead to improved relative
employment and wage outcomes, as well as to higher productivity. We also find no evidence
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that women in leadership positions implement policies that would be more friendly to female
employees.
In conclusion, while it certainly may be desirable to promote a higher presence of women
in leadership positions on the grounds of equality of opportunity, and possibly because of
long-term considerations (e.g., women today may serve as role models for younger genera-
tions, and thus help to break the glass ceiling), the findings in this paper do not support the
view that a higher concentration of women at the top of the organizational hierarchy leads
to tangible effects on either firm outcomes or on relative female standing in the workplace.
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Study Sample Definition of Female 
Leadership
Outcomes Methodology Results
Wolfers (2006) S&P 1500 companies Female CEOs Excess stock returns OLS, matching No effect
Smith et al. (2006) Large Danish firms Fraction of women among top 
executives and in board of 
directors
Value added, profits, net 
results
Firm fixed effects, IV 
(education of male CEO's 
spouses)
Positive effect on performance (OLS, 
IV); no effect (FE, IV-FE).
Amore et al. (2013) Family-controlled firms in Italy Fraction female among CEOs 
and directors
Return on assets Fixed effects, triple differences Positive effect on performance of 
female CEOs when coupled with 
female directors.
Parrotta and Smith (2013) Danish companies with more 
than 50 employees
Female CEO, female chairman,  
and female share among 
directors
Investment, profits, returns on 
equity, sales (levels and 
volatility)
Fixed effects No effect on levels, female-led firms 
have lower variability in all outcome 
variables.
Adams and Ferreira (2009) S&P 500, S&P MidCaps, S&P 
SmallCap
Female directors Governance, firm performance 
(Tobin's q, return on assets)
Firm fixed effects, IV (fraction 
of male directors connected to 
female directors)
More attendance, more monitoring, 
lower firm performance
Adams and Funk (2012) Publicly traded firms in 
Sweden
Female CEOs and directors Values (achievement, power, 
benevolence) and risk 
attitudes
OLS, fixed effects Female directors have higher 
benevolence and  universalism, less 
power oriented, more risk-loving.
Ahern and Dittmar (2012) Publicly listed Norwegian firms Female directors Tobin's Q, excess returns 
around announcement of 
reform
Event study analysis; 
IV(fraction of female directors 
in 2002), with firm fixed effects
Stock prices drop at time of 
announcement; lower Tobin Q .
Matsa and Miller (2013) Listed and unlisted firms in 
Norway and other Nordic 
countries
Female directors Corporate profits and labor 
outcomes
DD (listed and unlisted firms in 
Norway, before and after 
gender quota); DDD 
(comparison to other Nordic 
countries)
Fewer workforce reductions, higher 
labor costs, lower operating profits.
Table 1: Summary of Exisiting Literature
A1: Female CEOs and top executives
A2: Women in the board of directors - General
A3: Women in the board of directors - The Norwegian gender quota experiment
Panel A: The effect of female leadership on corporate performance
Study Sample Definition of Female 
Leadership
Outcomes Methodology Results
Flabbi et al. (2013) Italian manufacturing firms Female executives and female 
CEO
Sales, value added and TFP per 
worker; wages.
Fixed effects Positive interaction effect of female 
leadership and female workers on 
firm performance; female leaderhsip 
raises female wages at the top, 
lowers wages at the bottom.
Cardoso and Winter-Ebmer 
(2007)
Private Portuguese firms in 
manufacturing and services
 Female owners or female top-
paid managers 
Wages OLS, fixed effects Higher female wages and lower male 
wages in female-led firms.  
Tate and Yang (2014) Non-farm establishments in 23 
US states
Fraction female among top 5 
paid workers
Wage loss following plant 
closure
Diff in Diff (comparison of 
workers who move from same 
closing plant to same hiring 
plant).
Women experience smaller relative 
wage loss after displacement if hired 
by female-led firms.
Bertrand et al. (2014) Public limited liability (ASA) 
companies in Norway
Female directors Representation of women at 
various percentiles of the wage 
distribution; gender wage gap.
IV(fraction of female directors 
in 2002), with firm fixed effects
Increased representation of women 
among top 5 highest earners; no 
effect at other points in the 
distrbution; no effect on the gender 
wage gap
Matsa and Miller (2014) Privately owned US firms Majority female in ownership 
and control
Workforce reductions during 
Great Recession
OLS with extensive set of 
controls, matching.
Female owned firms had smaller 
workforce reductions.
Panel B: The effect of female leadership on employee outcomes
Table 1 (contd.): Summary of Exisiting Literature
Year
Number of 
establishments
Number of 
establishments in 
the analysis
Fraction women 
in top layer of 
management
Fraction women 
among working 
proprietors
1993 4,265 3,346 - 0.156
1994 4,154 3,168 - -
1995 4,134 3,063 - -
1996 4,949 3,363 - -
1997 4,591 2,935 - 0.080
1998 5,364 3,202 - 0.092
1999 5,749 3,354 - 0.107
2000 9,776 6,069 - 0.099
2001 11,522 7,084 - 0.104
2002 11,988 7,079 - 0.116
2003 12,233 6,625 - 0.116
2004 12,533 6,770 0.139 0.116
2005 12,904 6,768 - 0.117
2006 12,867 6,483 - 0.122
2007 12,366 6,360 - 0.122
2008 12,427 6,206 0.151 0.130
2009 12,900 6,295 - 0.140
2010 13,304 5,883 - 0.140
2011 13,317 5,886 - 0.151
2012 13,707 6,204 0.185 0.158
Total 195,050 106,143 0.158 0.123
Notes: Author's calculations based on the IAB Establishment Panel and Linked Employer-
Employee data. Proprietors also include family members of the proprietors. The top 
management includes executives, proprietors, directors, branch managers and works
managers.
Table 2: Sample Description and Fraction of Women in Management
N Frequency N Frequency
Size: Type:
10-19 13,636 0.129 Single 54,191 0.566
20-49 25,616 0.241 Branch 26,899 0.281
50-99 16,861 0.159 Head Office 14,675 0.153
100-199 14,673 0.138
200-499 17,240 0.162 Collective wage agreement:
500-999 8,251 0.078 Industry-wide 58,846 0.617
1000-4999 8,915 0.084 Company 7,317 0.010
5000+ 951 0.009 No agreement 7,317 0.283
Sector: Region:
Agriculture 937 0.009 Schleswig-Holstein 6,938 0.065
Mining 2,310 0.022 Hamburg 4,016 0.038
Manufacturing 30,140 0.284 Niedersachsen 11,643 0.110
Construction 6,623 0.062 Bremen 6,701 0.063
Retail 12,729 0.120 Nordrhein-Westfalen 18,559 0.175
Transport 5,434 0.051 Hessen 9,978 0.094
Finance 4,498 0.042 Rheinland-Pfalz/Saarland 7,480 0.071
Education 3,977 0.038 Baden-W¸rttemberg 13,359 0.126
Health 9,786 0.092 Bayern 13,388 0.126
Public 12,220 0.115 Saarland 5,699 0.054
Other 8,624 0.081 Berlin 8,382 0.079
Legal form: Observations:
Individually-owned 6,563 0.068 1 7,559 0.299
Partnership 5,809 0.060 2 4,125 0.163
Limited liability company 53,534 0.554 3 2,481 0.098
Company limited by shares 6,999 0.072 4+ 11,151 0.440
Public corporation 16,454 0.170
Other 7,317 0.076
Table 3: Summary Statistics of Establishments
Notes: N is the n. of establishments in the panel. All variables are 0/1 dummies, and the frequency represents the fraction of
each category in the sample. Size represents total employment as reported in the Establishment Survey, inclusive of workers
not subject to Social Security. Branch also includes middle-level authorities.
Panel A: Firm outcomes
N Mean exp(Mean) Std. Dev. Min Max
Log (business volume per worker) 55,425 11.733 124,661.8 1.137 -4.635 19.067
Log (investments per worker) 65,029 5.337 207.9 5.152 -8.825 15.578
Log (wage bill per worker) 90,857 7.642 2,083.0 0.474 4.017 10.192
Log (employment) 106,143 4.670 106.7 1.507 2.303 11.167
Hiring rate 78,229 0.052 - 0.128 0 1
Termination rate 78,303 0.049 - 0.107 0 1
Pct. workers on flexible time 53,424 0.507 - 0.455 0 1
Female friendly policy index 26,094 0.146 - 0.204 0 1
Any workplace childcare facilities 26,067 0.086 - 0.281 0 1
Any help for employees on parental leave 26,051 0.262 - 0.440 0 1
Any promotion of female junior staff 26,045 0.096 - 0.294 0 1
Panel B: Employee Outcomes (bottom 95%)
N Mean exp(Mean) Std. Dev. Min Max
Log female full-time employment 87,252 2.875 17.7 1.741 0 9.039
Log male full-time employment 87,252 3.567 35.4 1.837 0 10.727
Log female part-time employment 87,252 2.225 9.3 1.747 0 8.688
Log male part-time employment 87,252 1.102 3.0 1.348 0 8.219
Log female full-time wage 75,107 4.182 65.5 0.412 -1.282 5.153
Log male full-time wage 75,616 4.352 77.7 0.401 -0.692 5.153
Log female part-time wage 55,666 3.377 29.3 1.016 -2.659 5.153
Log male part-time wage 70,295 3.531 34.2 0.709 -1.965 5.135
Table 4: Summary Statistics of Dependent Variables
Notes: Business volume is either sales or assets in the calendar year prior to the survey. Wage bill is the monthly wage bill in June.
Business volume and Investments are measured for private sector firms only. Female friendly policy index is the average of seven
female friendly policies: provision of childcare, parental leave, promotion and mentoring of female junior staff, support for employees
with relatives requiring care, consideration of needs of employees with care responsibilities, member of a network of family friendly
companies (all 0/1 dummies), and other (unspecified). In Panel B, outcomes refer to bottom 95% wage workers: employment is the
number of workers, and wages are per day. All monetary values measured in 2005 euros.
PANEL A
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.368 *** 0.001 - -1.353 *** -0.311 - -0.188 *** 0.012 0.059
(0.038) (0.113) - (0.222) (1.212) - (0.015) (0.031) (0.065)
{7,009} {7,009} - {8,294} {8,294} - {15,445} {15,445} {4,140}
-0.249 *** 0.001 -0.006 -0.742 *** -0.030 -0.033 -0.149 *** -0.012 -0.013
(0.028) (0.015) (0.015) (0.136) (0.193) (0.236) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011)
{35,208} {35,208} {28,336} {40,375} {40,375} {32,913} {54,916} {54,916} {42,696}
PANEL B
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.378 *** 0.012 0.015 0.021 *** 0.000 -0.004 0.017 *** 0.005 -0.004
(0.033) (0.032) (0.042) (0.005) (0.015) (0.020) (0.004) (0.010) (0.015)
{18,410} {18,410} {5,325} {14,295} {14,295} {4,272} {14,306} {14,306} {4,290}
-0.272 *** 0.000 0.010 0.025 *** 0.004 -0.006 0.017 *** -0.001 -0.004
(0.029) (0.010) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
{61,865} {61,865} {48,381} {46,147} {46,147} {38,109} {46,203} {46,203} {38,165}
Log (employment)
Table 5: Fraction of Women in Top Management and Establishment Outcomes
Notes. In all specifications we also control for firm size, year, sector, legal form, establishment type (single establishment, branch, company headquarters), presence
of a wage agreement, and region fixed effects, plus mean age, mean tenure, % college and % foreign among workers in top 5% wage. In FE columns we additionally
include establishment fixed-effects, and in FE+t columns establishment-specific time trends (linear). FE+t estimates of the fraction of women in top layer of
management not available for business volume and investments, which are not observed in 2012. Standard errors clustered at firm level in brackets, number of
observations in curly brackets. See also footnotes to Tables 2-4.
Log (wage bill per worker)
Fraction women in top 
layer of management
Log (business volume per worker) Log (investments per worker)
Hiring Rate Termination Rate
Fraction women in top 
layer of management
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
PANEL A
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.031 *** -0.041 -0.039 0.025 *** 0.021 0.015
(0.012) (0.040) (0.089) (0.005) (0.018) (0.033)
{18,191} {18,191} {5,267} {18,336} {18,336} {5,298}
-0.019 -0.029 -0.027 0.015 *** 0.013 0.020
(0.012) (0.019) (0.025) (0.005) (0.017) (0.029)
{35,614} {35,614} {24,520} {17,300} {17,300} {5,620}
PANEL B
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
0.038 *** 0.037 0.026 0.011 0.015 -0.020 0.024 *** 0.006 0.016
(0.008) (0.029) (0.044) (0.011) (0.047) (0.093) (0.008) (0.029) (0.055)
{18,312} {18,312} {5,295} {18,297} {18,297} {5,277} {18,294} {18,294} {5,265}
0.011 0.027 0.037 0.012 -0.003 0.024 0.037 *** 0.023 -0.004
(0.007) (0.027) (0.041) (0.011) (0.045) (0.078) (0.007) (0.029) (0.044)
{17,284} {17,284} {5,617} {17,271} {17,271} {5,610} {17,265} {17,265} {5,603}
Any help for employees on parental leave Any promotion of female junior staff
Table 6: Fraction of Women in Top Management and Female Friendly Policies
Notes. Female friendly policy index is the average of seven female friendly policies. In all specifications we also control for firm size, year, sector, legal form,
establishment type (single establishment, branch, company headquarters), presence of a wage agreement, and region fixed effects, plus mean age, mean tenure, %
college and % foreign among workers in top 5% wage. In FE columns we additionally include establishment fixed-effects, and in FE+t columns establishment-specific 
time trends (linear). Standard errors clustered at firm level in brackets, number of observations in curly brackets. See also footnotes to Tables 2-4.
Any workplace childcare facilities
Pct. workers on flexible time Female friendly policy index
Fraction women in top layer 
of management
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Fraction women in top layer 
of management
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
PANEL A
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.140 *** 0.059 - -0.858 *** 0.007 -
(0.050) (0.080) - (0.053) (0.082) -
{11,448} {11,456} - {11,448} {11,456} -
-0.132 *** -0.001 -0.002 -0.574 *** -0.012 -0.004
(0.040) (0.017) (0.016) (0.041) (0.016) (0.014)
{49,088} {49,127} {37,430} {49,088} {49,127} {37,430}
PANEL B
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
0.096 * 0.054 - -0.275 *** 0.016 -
(0.050) (0.094) - (0.045) (0.110) -
{11,448} {11,456} - {11,448} {11,456} -
-0.002 -0.001 0.021 -0.150 *** 0.001 0.028
(0.041) (0.021) (0.019) (0.035) (0.024) (0.026)
{49,088} {49,127} {37,430} {49,088} {49,127} {37,430}
Fraction women in top 
layer of management
Notes. All outcomes measured at time t , in 2005 euros (where applicable), and refer to the bottom 95% wage workers.
Wages are per day. In all specifications we also control for firm size, year, sector, legal form, establishment type (single
establishment, branch, company headquarters), presence of a wage agreement, and region fixed effects, plus mean
age, mean tenure, % college and % foreign among workers in top 5% wage. In FE columns we additionally include
establishment fixed-effects, and in FE+t columns establishment-specific time trends (linear). FE+t estimates of the
fraction of women in top layer of management not available for employee-level outcomes, which are not observed in
2012. Standard errors clustered at firm level in brackets, number of observations in curly brackets. See also footnotes 
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Table 7: Fraction of Women in Top Management and Employee Outcomes - Employment
Log (female full-time employment) Log (male full-time employment)
Fraction women in top 
layer of management
Log (female part-time employment) Log (male part-time employment)
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
PANEL A
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.121 *** -0.015 - -0.164 *** -0.004 -
(0.024) (0.056) - (0.032) (0.044) -
{9,857} {9,865} - {9,888} {9,896} -
-0.108 *** -0.027 ** -0.016 * -0.139 *** -0.022 -0.001
(0.020) (0.013) (0.009) (0.032) (0.023) (0.009)
{41,880} {41,907} {30,982} {42,396} {42,424} {31,494}
PANEL B
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.077 ** 0.044 - -0.125 *** 0.092 -
(0.037) (0.099) - (0.051) (0.181) -
{9,486} {9,492} - {8,162} {8,168} -
-0.074 *** -0.012 -0.004 -0.075 * -0.044 -0.035
(0.027) (0.013) (0.012) (0.042) (0.032) (0.037)
{39,279} {39,298} {28,909} {32,046} {32,063} {23,034}
Log (female wage), part-time Log (male wage), part-time
Fraction women in top layer 
of management
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Notes. All outcomes measured at time t , in 2005 euros (where applicable), and refer to the bottom 95% of wage
workers. Wages are per day. In all specifications we also control for firm size, year, sector, legal form, establishment type
(single establishment, branch, company headquarters), presence of a wage agreement, and region fixed effects, plus
mean age, mean tenure, % college and % foreign among workers in top 5% wage. In FE columns we additionally include
establishment fixed-effects, and in FE+t columns establishment-specific time trends (linear). FE+t estimates of the
fraction of women in top layer of management not available for employee-level outcomes, which are not observed in
2012. Standard errors clustered at firm level in brackets, number of observations in curly brackets. See also footnotes to 
Log (female wage), full-time Log (male wage), full-time
Fraction women in top layer 
of management
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Table 8: Fraction of Women in Top Management and Employee Outcomes - Wages
PANEL A
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.043 -0.012 0.007 0.038 0.037 -0.066 0.095 0.078 0.085
(0.039) (0.059) (0.070) (0.050) (0.070) (0.082) (0.118) (0.128) (0.179)
{17,472} {17,472} {14,051} {16,755} {16,755} {13,595} {4,705} {4,705} {3,825}
PANEL B
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
0.012 ** 0.018 0.043 0.019 *** 0.011 -0.002 0.006 -0.034 -0.092
(0.006) (0.020) (0.029) (0.008) (0.031) (0.054) (0.031) (0.112) (0.212)
{7,493} {7,493} {2,477} {7,834} {7,834} {2,515} {1,973} {1,973} {628}
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Notes. Size is the total employment at the establishment, including workers not subject to social security. In all specifications we also control for firm size, year, sector,
legal form, establishment type (single establishment, branch, company headquarters), presence of a wage agreement, and region fixed effects, plus mean age, mean
tenure, % college and % foreign among workers in top 5% wage. In FE columns we additionally include establishment fixed-effects, and in FE+t columns establishment-
specific time trends (linear). Standard errors clustered at firm level in brackets, number of observations in curly brackets. See also footnote to Tables 2-4.
Table 9: Fraction of Women Among Working Proprietors and Establishment Outcomes, by Establishment Size
10-49 50-499 500+
Log (business volume per worker)
Female friendly policy index
Log (business volume per worker) Log (business volume per worker)
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Female friendly policy index Female friendly policy index
PANEL A
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
0.088 *** 0.005 -0.012 -0.037 -0.001 0.012 0.230 * -0.012 -0.010
(0.036) (0.024) (0.026) (0.051) (0.022) (0.020) (0.118) (0.034) (0.039)
{20,298} {20,321} {14,946} {22,885} {22,899} {17,667} {5,905} {5,907} {4,817}
PANEL B
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.349 *** -0.008 0.001 -0.496 *** -0.004 0.004 -0.337 *** -0.050 -0.072
(0.038) (0.021) (0.023) (0.058) (0.022) (0.019) (0.139) (0.047) (0.054)
{20,298} {20,321} {14,946} {22,885} {22,899} {17,667} {5,905} {5,907} {4,817}
PANEL C
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.081 *** 0.009 0.016 -0.084 *** -0.006 -0.007 -0.133 *** -0.044 ** -0.024 *
(0.017) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.007) (0.008) (0.036) (0.020) (0.013)
{15,905} {15,917} {11,172} {20,157} {20,170} {15,081} {5,818} {5,820} {4,729}
PANEL D
OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t OLS FE FE+t
-0.117 *** 0.010 -0.011 -0.104 *** 0.001 0.007 -0.176 *** -0.040 -0.004
(0.018) (0.013) (0.014) (0.020) (0.011) (0.012) (0.060) (0.036) (0.013)
{16,386} {16,399} {11,662} {20,196} {20,209} {15,108} {5,814} {5,816} {4,724}
Notes. Size is the total employment at the establishment, including workers not subject to social security. All outcomes measured at time t , in 2005 euros (where
applicable), and refer to the bottom 95% of wage workers. Wages are per day. In all specifications we also control for firm size, year, sector, legal form, establishment
type (single establishment, branch, company headquarters), presence of a wage agreement, and region fixed effects, plus mean age, mean tenure, % college and %
foreign among workers in top 5% wage. In FE columns we additionally include establishment fixed-effects, and in FE+t columns establishment-specific time trends
(linear). Standard errors clustered at firm level in brackets, number of observations in curly brackets. See also footnote to Tables 2-4.
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Log (male full-time employment) Log (male full-time employment) Log (male full-time employment)
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Log (female wage), full-time Log (female wage), full-time Log (female wage), full-time
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Log (male wage), full-time Log (male wage), full-time Log (male wage), full-time
Fraction women among 
working proprietors
Log (female full-time employment) Log (female full-time employment) Log (female full-time employment)
Table 10: Fraction of Women Among Working Proprietors and Employee Outcomes, by Establishment Size
10-49 50-499 500+
